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Abstract—This study addresses incident handling during an
adverse event for dynamical networked control systems. Incident
handling can be divided into five steps: detection, analysis,
containment, eradication, and recovery. For networked control
systems, the containment step can be conducted through physical
disconnection of an attacked subsystem. In accordance with
the disconnection, the equipped attack detection unit should be
reconfigured to maintain its detection capability. In particular,
separating the detection subunit associated with the disconnected
subsystem is considered as a specific reconfiguration scheme in
this study. This paper poses the problem of disconnection-aware
attack detection and isolation with the separation-based detector
reconfiguration. The objective is to find an attack detection unit
that preserves its detection and isolation capability even under
any possible disconnection and separation. The difficulty arises
from network topology variation caused by disconnection that
can possibly lead to stability loss of the distributed observer inside
the attack detection unit. A solution is proposed based on an
existing controller design technique referred to as retrofit control.
Furthermore, an application to low-voltage power distribution
networks with distributed generation is exhibited. Numerical
examples evidence the practical use of the proposed method
through a benchmark distribution network.
Index Terms—Attack detection, incident handling, networked
control systems, resilient systems, system reconfiguration.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE recent tremendous drive towards increasing connec-tivity among cyber-physical components leaves the re-
sulting networked systems vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In
fact, substantive malware programs targeting physical systems
have been reported [1], and some of them, such as, Stuxnet [2],
[3], BlackEnergy 3 [4], and HatMan [5], have succeeded in
causing serious damages to critical infrastructure networks [6].
For secure operation of networked physical systems, novel
security schemes in the physical layer are required aside
from the existing information security techniques because of
difference between the requirements of information systems
and physical systems [7]. Furthermore, enhancing security in
physical layers in addition to information layers fits the notion
of “defense in depth” advocated in [8], which argues the
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importance of duplex protections. For an overview of control
system security, see [9].
Model-based attack detection [10] is one of the most used
techniques in the protection schemes provided by the control
community. The basic idea is to create a dynamical model
that imitates the evolution of physical state and to confirm
that data collected from the actual system coincide with the
predicted time series. Typically, an attack detection unit is
composed of a residual generator and an attack detector.
The residual generator calculates the discrepancy between the
measured output and the predicted output, while the attack
detector decides whether to raise an alarm based on the
residual signal exploiting its statistics. The detection unit can
possess an additional function of identifying the components
being attacked [11]. Classical model-based fault diagnosis
techniques [12] help in residual generator design, and hypoth-
esis testing methods can be utilized for designing an attack
detector [13].
Meanwhile, according to the security guide for information
systems provided by National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology [14], incident handling during an adverse event can be
divided into five steps: detection, analysis, containment, erad-
ication, and recovery. In particular, containment is conducted
by disconnecting a segment of infected workstations from the
network [14], [15]. When this idea is analogized to networked
control systems, the model-based attack detection can be
regarded as the detection and analysis steps, and the contain-
ment step can be performed through physical disconnection
of infected subsystems from the entire network. Moreover,
in accordance with network topology variation caused by
disconnection for containment, the equipped attack detection
unit should be reconfigured.
As a specific reconfiguration scheme, we adopt separation-
based reconfiguration, namely, separating the local detection
subunit associated with the disconnected subsystem without
modification of the remaining units. This reconfiguration can
be quickly conducted by simply switching off the corre-
sponding communication. Further, this scheme can easily be
implemented because neither a bank of pre-designed detection
units nor redesign of those units are required.
This study addresses the disconnection-aware attack de-
tection and isolation problem with separation-based detector
reconfiguration for incident handling in networked control
systems. Technical difficulty arises from its variable commu-
nication topology, which drastically changes the dynamics of
the entire residual generator. Typically, the residual generator
contains a state observer with output estimation error feedback
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
11
20
5v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  2
3 S
ep
 20
20
2 IEEE JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXX 20XX
on the premise that the system to be protected is fixed. This
feedback architecture of the residual generator can possibly
violate its stability under separation-based reconfiguration.
Thus, its detection capability cannot be guaranteed even if the
residual generator can operate well for the nominal system
where all subsystems are connected.
This paper proposes a residual generator design method
that can preserve its stability and tracking capability under
any disconnection. The proposed approach is to preserve the
entire stability by designing a distributed observer every local
component of which maintains the dynamical map of the
communication signals to be invariant. This idea is borrowed
from an existing controller design technique referred to as
retrofit control [16], [17], which has originally been proposed
for modular design of control systems. It is shown that, the
proposed architecture of the residual generator can preserve
not only the stability but also the detection capability. It is also
shown that attack isolation can also be performed through the
proposed architecture under disconnection. Furthermore, an
application to inverter-based low-voltage distribution networks
with distributed generation is exhibited.
Contribution
First, we formally pose the disconnection-aware attack
detector design problem in the context of incident handling.
Second, we provide a design method of a detection unit that
can preserve its detection capability even under separation-
based reconfiguration. Further, we propose a disconnection-
aware isolation filter design method. Third, we demonstrate
its application to low-voltage distribution networks with dis-
tributed energy resources. Fourth, and finally, we illustrate
the potential impact of our theoretical development through
compelling examples. In particular, we numerically confirm
the effectiveness of the designed attack detector using a
benchmark model of a European distribution network [18].
A preliminary version of this work was presented in [19]. The
additional topics include design of isolation filters, detailed
proofs of the theoretical findings, and elaborate simulation
results.
Related Work
A few related works that propose secure control system
design with separation-based reconfiguration can be found. To
the best of the authors’ knowledge, fallback control in [20],
[21] is the first work that explicitly points out the importance
of continuous operation of control systems under containment
of attacks. The fallback system is designed so as to enable the
protected system to operate without communication from the
external network, and then fundamental functions are not lost
even under containment of attacks. A possible drawback is that
the design method is inapplicable to complex systems because
a switched Lyapunov function, which could be difficult to find
for large-scale systems, is needed to be designed. Another
potentially applicable approach is the plug-and-play distributed
fault detection [22] based on the partition-based distributed
Kalman filter [23]. The residual generator design can be
carried out in a distributed and scalable manner as long as the
interaction matrices satisfy a small-gain condition. Similarly,
based on the small-gain approach, a distributed residual gener-
ator which can be designed only with its corresponding local
subsystem is proposed in [11]. A potential shortcoming of
those approaches is inapplicability to strongly interconnected
systems.
Active fault tolerant control [24] is a promising approach to
handle drastic change of the system dynamics to be controlled,
including a residual generator in the context of diagnosis.
In its framework, the dynamics of the designed controller
is adjusted in response to component malfunctions. Recon-
figuration without physical redundancy can be classified into
the following threefold [25]: projection with a bank of pre-
designed controllers, learning, and automatic redesign. In any
case, large memory or powerful processing units are required
for implementation, which can be restrictive in highly complex
systems. Moreover, the reconfiguration should be quickly
carried out especially in the presence of a strategic attacker.
From those perspectives, separation-based reconfiguration in
our approach does not need such abundant computational
resources and can be conducted immediately after attack
detection.
Organization and Notation
In Section II, we provide a mathematical model of the
networked system to be protected and the attack detection unit
to be designed. Based on the preliminaries, the disconnection-
aware attack detection and isolation problems are formulated.
Section III solves the formulated problems. In Section IV, we
demonstrate the proposed design procedure for a low-voltage
distribution network with distributed generation. Section V
verifies the theoretical findings and the practical effectiveness
of our proposed approach through numerical examples for
the CIGRE (International Council on Large Electric Systems)
benchmark model [18]. Finally, Section VI draws conclusion.
The cardinality of a set I is denoted by |I|, the power set
of a set X is denoted by 2X , the dimension of a vector x
by dim(x), the transpose of a matrix M by MT, the rank
of a matrix M by rankM , the vector where xi for i ∈ I
are concatenated vertically by xI , the block diagonal system
whose diagonal blocks are composed of Gi for i ∈ I by
diag(Gi)i∈I , where the subscript is omitted when I is clear
from the context, the set of all stable real rational transfer
function matrices by RH∞, and the normal rank of a transfer
matrix G [26] by rankG.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION: DISCONNECTION-AWARE
ATTACK DETECTION AND ISOLATION
A. Networked Control System, Model-based Attack Detector,
and Separation-based Detector Reconfiguration
Consider a networked control system being possibly under
attack. Let a dynamical model of the networked system
be given as a linear time-invariant system composed of N
subsystems
Σi :
 x˙i = Aixi +Biri + Uivi +Xiaiyi = Cixi +Diri + Vivi + Yiai
wi= Eixi + Firi +Wivi + Ziai
, i = 1, . . . , N
(1)
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where xi, ri, yi, vi, wi, ai denote the state, the reference in-
put, the measurement output, the inflowing interaction, the
outflowing interaction, and the signal caused by the attack,
respectively. Let[
yi
wi
]
=
[
Gyiri Gyivi Gyiai
Gwiri Gwivi Gwiai
] rivi
ai

denote the frequency-domain representation of the ith subsys-
tem. The interaction among the subsystems is represented by
v = Lw
with a transfer matrix L where v and w are the stacked vectors
of vi and wi for i = 1, . . . , N , respectively. The networked
control system is assumed to be well-posed for simplicity.
We consider designing a model-based attack detector with
measurement of the outputs and information on the reference
signals using the dynamical model. A typical architecture of
an attack detection unit is composed of a residual generator,
which calculates the discrepancy between the measured output
and the predicted output, and an attack detector, which decides
whether to raise an alarm based on the residual signal. For
scalable implementation, we impose a distributed structure on
the residual generator to be designed such that
Ri :
[
i
wˆi
]
=
[
Riyi Riri Rivˆi
Rwˆiyi Rwˆiri Rwˆivˆi
] yiri
vˆi
 (2)
for i = 1, . . . , N , where i denotes the ith residual signal,
with the communication
vˆ = Lˆwˆ
where vˆ and wˆ are the stacked vectors of communication
signals vˆi and wˆi transmitted through a transfer matrix Lˆ. The
transfer matrix Lˆ is assumed to have the same sparsity pattern
as that of L, i.e., the (i, j)th block component of Lˆ is zero
if that of L is zero. Its architecture is illustrated by Fig. 1,
where the distributed residual generator has the same network
topology as that of the networked control system. Based on the
generated residual signal, an attack detector decides whether
to raise an alarm, i.e.,
θi = Θi(i), i = 1, . . . , N
where θi(t), which takes a binary value, represents the decision
at time t and Θi denotes the decision rule. The decision rule
can be either static or dynamic, where static detectors are often
referred to as stateless detectors, while dynamic detectors are
referred to as stateful detectors.
The above processes correspond to the detection and anal-
ysis steps of incident handling [14]. The next step is con-
tainment of attacks for reducing their impacts before the
effects spread over the network. In practical cyber-physical
systems, there are several options for containment, including
disconnection from a network, replacement with a redundant
device, shutting down a workstation, and disabling certain
functions [27]. In this study, disconnection of components
presumed to be attacked is treated as a specific action for
containment. We suppose that, when the ith attack detector
Fig. 1. Architecture of the networked control system to be protected and
the distributed residual generator to be designed. The distributed residual
generator has the same network topology as that of the networked control
system. In this figure, when an alarm rings at the fifth detection unit, the
corresponding subsystem Σ5 is disconnected from the networked system
for attack containment. Simultaneously, the distributed residual generator is
reconfigured through the separation of the fifth local residual generator R5.
raises an alarm, a collection of subsystems including the ith
subsystem Σi is disconnected from the networked control
system.
Network topology change caused by disconnection leads to
variation of the dynamics. Let I ⊂ {1, . . . , N} denote the
index set of the remaining subsystems complying with the
conducted disconnection. The interaction among the remaining
subsystems is assumed to be represented by
vI = LIwI (3)
where LI denotes the submatrix of L composed of its (i, j)th
block components for i, j ∈ I. The input-output map can be
represented by
yI = TyIrIrI + TyIaIaI (4)
where
TyIrI := diag(Gyiri) + diag(Gyivi)QIdiag(Gwiri),
TyIaI := diag(Gyiai) + diag(Gyivi)QIdiag(Gwiai)
with QI := LI(I−diag(Gwivi)LI)−1. The entire networked
control system for I is denoted by ΣI . As with the nominal
case, the resulting networked control system is also assumed
to be well-posed.
For handling the varying network topology, the distributed
residual generator is assumed to be able to modify its archi-
tecture through separation-based reconfiguration. The recon-
figured distributed residual generator is given by (2) for i ∈ I
with
vˆI = LˆIwˆI (5)
where LˆI is the submatrix of Lˆ composed of its (i, j)th
block components for i, j ∈ I. The transfer matrix LˆI
can be interpreted as the resulting communication under the
separation of the local residual generators associated with the
disconnected subsystems as illustrated by Fig. 1. This reconfig-
uration scheme has an advantage that it can be quickly carried
out by simply switching off the corresponding communication.
Moreover, a bank of pre-designed residual generators, the
number of which should be enormous for large-scale systems,
is not required, and hence, it is easy to implement. The entire
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Fig. 2. Entire signal-flow diagram with I = {i1, . . . , in} including the
networked control system to be protected, the distributed residual generator,
and the attack detectors.
dynamics of the remaining residual generator is represented
by
RI : I = RIyIyI +RIrIrI (6)
where I denotes the generated residual signal, and RIyI
and RIrI represent the transfer matrices with respect to the
subscript signals. The entire block diagram is depicted by
Fig. 2.
B. Premises for Problem Formulation
Several premises are required for formulating the problem.
First, the networked system itself is necessarily able to operate
under disconnection. Let I ⊂ 2{1,...,N} denote the family
of all possible remaining index sets under any pre-arranged
disconnection. The following assumption is made.
Assumption 1 The networked system ΣI is internally stable
for any I ∈ I.
Note that Assumption 1 is essentially needed regardless of
the choice of the attack detection unit to be designed as long
as disconnection is employed as attack containment.
In practice, arranging particular subsystems that are dis-
connected in compliance with each alarm, namely, choice
of I, is included in the design process. This arrangement,
called network segmentation, is a commonly adopted idea
for suppressing attack propagation in information system se-
curity [28]. Clearly, network segmentation for a networked
control system should be performed such that the resulting
I satisfies the requirement in Assumption 1. This procedure
can be a technically difficult problem although this study does
not discuss particular segmentation methods. A brute-force
approach based on numerical simulation is applicable when
the networked system is not too complicated. For large-scale
systems, a passivity-based approach is promising. When the
components of the networked system are passive [29] and its
interaction is formed as a negative feedback, simply choosing
each passive subsystem as a part to be disconnected, which
results in I = 2{1,...,N}, leads to a proper segmentation. In-
deed, our primarily intended application, distribution network
systems with distributed generation, has this property as shown
in Section IV.
Subsequently, we make another premise on detection capa-
bility achieved with the measurement signal. As a preparation,
we confine attention to the situation where the initial state is
zero, i.e., xi(0) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N . This situation implies
that the steady state at which the system operates in the attack-
free case is known to the detector designer. Basically, our
approach can apply even for the case where the initial state is
unknown, the detail of which is described in Appendix A.
Under this preparation, undetectable attacks are defined as
follows [11].
Definition 1 (Undetectable Attack) Consider the networked
system ΣI . An attack aI 6= 0 is said to be undetectable with
knowledge of initial state when yI,aI = yI where yI,aI and
yI denote the outputs with and without the attack aI , under
zero initial state, respectively.
Undetectable attacks cannot be coped with using the detec-
tion framework considered in this paper. Thus, the following
assumption is made.
Assumption 2 Consider the networked system ΣI . There do
not exist any undetectable attacks with knowledge of initial
state for any I ∈ I.
The following lemma [30] characterizes existence of unde-
tectable attacks with knowledge of initial state in the frequency
domain.
Lemma 1 There do not exist any undetectable attacks with
knowledge of initial state if and only if TyIaI is left invertible.
As indicated by Lemma 1, undetectable attacks rely on the
(normal) rank deficiency of the corresponding transfer matrix.
To eliminate the possibility of undetectable attacks, modifica-
tion of system architecture is required, e.g., introduction of
additional sensors.
C. Disconnection-aware Attack Detection and Isolation Prob-
lems
On the above premises, we formulate the disconnection-
aware attack detection problem.
Problem 1 (Disconnection-aware Attack Detection) Under
Assumptions 1 and 2, design a residual generator RI
composed of (2) with (5) such that RI ∈ RH∞ and
I 6= 0⇔ aI 6= 0 (7)
for any I ∈ I.
Problem 1 is equivalent to the well-known attack detec-
tor design problem when I is fixed. The difficulty arises
from network topology variation caused by disconnection.
A straightforward approach is to use the Luenberger-type
observer in a distributed form described by
Ri :

˙ˆxi = Aixˆi +Biri + Uivˆi −Hi(yi − yˆi)
yˆi = Cixˆi +Diri + Vivˆi
wˆi= Eixˆi + Firi +Wivˆi
i = yi − yˆi
(8)
for i = 1, . . . , N with the communication vˆ = Lwˆ and to
determine the observer gains through linear matrix inequalities
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(LMIs) imposed by the tracking capability for any I ∈ I.
Clearly, this LMI-based approach is inapplicable when |I| is
large.
As an advanced protection, we also consider attack isolation,
namely, identification of the attacked subsystem. Isolation
capability under disconnection is a more serious issue than that
without disconnection. If we disconnect the wrong subsystems
from the networked system, the attack cannot be eliminated,
and it can potentially lead to sequential disconnection causing
cascading failure. A possible isolation method is to design
the residual generator such that the ith residual is excited
only by attacks injected into the ith subsystem. This idea can
mathematically be described by
i 6= 0⇔ ai 6= 0. (9)
Simultaneous multiple-attacks can be isolated if (9) is satisfied
for the subsystems. However, this condition is much stricter
than that of Problem 1, and hence there may not exist any
residual generator that satisfies (9). Thus we first derive a
condition on a subsystem such that there exists a residual
generator with (9) satisfied. Subsequently, if some subsystems
fulfill the derived condition, we design a residual generator
such that the corresponding attacks can be isolated. The
problem is formulated as follows.
Problem 2 (Disconnection-aware Attack Isolation) Under
Assumptions 1 and 2, find a condition on Σi such that there
exists a residual generator RI such that (9) is satisfied for
any I ∈ I.
As with Problem 1, this problem can be reduced to a classic
isolation problem if I is fixed, and the difficulty arises from
the varying network topology.
III. PROPOSED DISCONNECTION-AWARE RESIDUAL
GENERATOR DESIGN
In this section, we propose a residual generator design
method that can preserve its detection and isolation capability
under separation-based reconfiguration. Based on the proposed
architecture, a solution to the formulated problem is provided.
A. Design Parameters of Residual Generator
We first review a parameterization of all residual generators
in (6) for a fixed I without the constraint on the residual
generator structure. Let (MI , NI) be a left coprime fac-
torization of TyIrI over RH∞ [12, Definition 3.2]. Then
all residual generators in (6) can be parameterized in the
following sense [12, Theorem 5.3]: A residual generator in (6)
satisfies RI ∈ RH∞ and (7) if and only if there exists a left
invertible SI ∈ RH∞ such that
RI : I = SI(MIyI −NIrI). (10)
Furthermore, the residual signal with the residual generator is
governed by
I = SIMITyIaIaI . (11)
This parameterization implies that the residual generator de-
sign problem can be reduced to finding a left coprime factor-
ization (MI , NI) and an appropriate SI that can be realized
through the structured residual generator.
In the parameterization, the pair (MI , NI) plays the role
of feedback operation, which is crucially related to response
speed and robustness. Indeed, left coprime factorization can
be carried out by designing a state observer [12, Lemma 3.1].
Thus it suffices to design an observer in the form of (2)
with (5) for design of (MI , NI). On the other hand, SI
plays the role of feedforward filter, such as isolation and noise
reduction. For handling disconnection, we consider block
diagonal SI given by
SI = diag(Si)i∈I (12)
with left invertible stable transfer matrices Si for i ∈ I.
It is clear that SI is left invertible if and only if Si is
left invertible for any i ∈ I. Because the block diagonal
structure is preserved under disconnection, it suffices to choose
appropriate Si for i = 1, . . . , N .
B. Proposed Disconnection-aware Attack Detection
This subsection addresses Problem 1, namely, the detection
problem. For detection, it suffices to design only the pair
(MI , NI) because SI can be chosen as any block diagonal
left-invertible stable transfer matrix. Hence we focus only on
design of (MI , NI), or equivalently, design of a distributed
observer with a given structure.
The crucial requirements for the observer to be designed
are as follows:
• The observer has the structure composed of (2) and (5).
• The structured observer preserves its tracking capability
for any I ∈ I.
The simplest observer that fulfills those requirements can be
designed by not utilizing error feedback inside the observer,
i.e., 
˙ˆxi = Aixˆi +Biri + Uivˆi
yˆi = Cixˆi +Diri + Vivˆi
wˆi= Eixˆi + Firi +Wivˆi
(13)
with
LˆI = LI . (14)
Clearly, the first requirement is satisfied. Moreover, since the
networked control system is stable for any I ∈ I from
Assumption 1, the second requirement is also satisfied. We
refer to the approach with this observer as the naive approach,
which results in
MI = I, NI = TyIrI
for any I ∈ I. However, since the naive approach cannot
move the poles of the residual generator at all, early attack
detection cannot be achieved when the time constant of the
attacked subsystem is large. To design a more sophisticated
attack detector, we seek for an observer different from the
naive one.
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Fig. 3. Block diagrams of the residual generator with the naive distributed observer (13), the Luenberger-type observer (8), and the proposed observer (15),
where Gyiµi is the transfer matrix from µi to yi, R−i contains Rj for j 6= i, j ∈ I, and vˆ−i, wˆ−i are defined in a similar manner. In the Luenverger-type
observer, a feedback architecture is introduced to the naive observer through µi. In the proposed observer, an additional signal νi is injected to rectify the
estimated outflowing interaction signal wˆi.
Let us consider introducing error feedback into (13) in a
decentralized manner, i.e.,
˙ˆxi = Aixˆi +Biri + Uivˆi + µi
yˆi = Cixˆi +Diri + Vivˆi
wˆi= Eixˆi + Firi +Wivˆi
with a certain feedback signal µi. The choice µi = Hi(yi−yˆi),
which results in the Luenberger-type observer (8), can lead
to instability of the residual generator under separation-based
reconfiguration even if the observer gains are determined so
as to stabilize the nominal distributed observer. Furthermore,
it is difficult to find a collection of observer gains with which
the distributed observer is stable for any I ∈ I as mentioned
in the problem formulation.
The key observation is that the outflowing interaction signal
under the error feedback is governed by
wˆi = Gwiriri +Gwivi vˆi +Gwiµiµi
where Gwiµi := Ei(sI−Ai)−1. Because µi can disturb wˆi, the
feedback interaction between the ith subsystem and the others
are also disturbed, which can be a cause of the instability. Thus
we expect that the stability can be guaranteed by maintaining
the interaction invariant under error feedback by adding an
artificial input signal that rectifies wˆi so as to remove the effect
of µi.
Based on this idea, we propose the following distributed
observer: 
˙ˆxi = Aixˆi +Biri + Uivˆi + µi
yˆi = Cixˆi +Diri + Vivˆi
wˆi= Eixˆi + Firi +Wivˆi + νi
(15)
and
µi = Hi(yi − yˆi),
{
˙ˆχi= Aiχˆi + µi
νi = −Eiχˆi, (16)
with the communication (14). Then we have
wˆi= Gwiriri +Gwivi vˆi +Gwiµiµi + νi
= Gwiriri +Gwivi vˆi,
(17)
which is the same as that of (13). Thus, it is guaranteed
that the stability of the residual generator is preserved under
separation. It should be emphasized that this choice does
not imply that the residual generator is not governed by
those inputs. Indeed, the estimated state xˆi is affected by
µi, and hence a feedback path inside the local state observer
remains even with νi. Block diagrams of the naive observer
with (13), the Luenberger-type observer (8), and the proposed
observer (15) are depicted in Fig. 3. It should also be remarked
that this idea originates from retrofit control [17], which has
been proposed for modular design of control systems. The
retrofit control framework is briefly reviewed in Appendix B.
We first show that this residual generator can be imple-
mented in the form of (2) and (5). The following lemma holds.
Lemma 2 Take the ith local residual generator in (2) as
Riyi = SiMi, Riri = −SiMiGyiri , Rivˆi = −SiMiGyivi ,
Rwˆiyi = 0, Rwˆiri = Gwiri , Rwˆivˆi = Gwivi ,
(18)
with a transfer matrix Si, where
Mi := (I +GyiµiHi)
−1
with Gyiµi := Ci(sI − Ai)−1, and the communication (14).
Then i = Si(yi−yˆi) holds where yˆi is generated through (15)
with (16) under (14).
Proof: It follows that
yi − yˆi = yi −Gyiriri −Gyivi vˆi −GyiµiHi(yi − yˆi)
⇒ yi − yˆi = Mi(yi −Gyiriri −Gyivi vˆi)
⇒ i = SiMi(yi −Gyiriri −Gyivi vˆi).
Thus the choice (18) with (14) generates the desired residual.
A remarkable fact is that the proposed residual generator
results in a block-diagonally structured MI given by
MI = diag(Mi)i∈I
although MI in (11) has a dense structure in general. The
following lemma holds.
Lemma 3 Under the residual generator (18) with (14), the
transfer matrices in (6) are given by
RIyI = diag(SiMi), RIrI = −diag(SiMi)TyIrI . (19)
Moreover, the transfer matrix from aI to I is given by
I = diag(SiMi)TyIaIaI . (20)
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Proof: Observe that vˆI = QIdiag(Gwiri)rI from (14).
This relation leads to (19). Moreover, from (4) and (19), the
latter claim also holds.
Lemma 3 proves the block diagonal structure of MI in (11).
In this sense, our approach can be interpreted as a method for
finding a block diagonal MI .
The above lemmas derive the following theorem, which
proves detection capability of the proposed residual generator.
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Choose the struc-
tured residual generator in compliance with (18) and (14).
Determine Hi and Si such that Ai − HiCi is Hurwitz and
Si ∈ RH∞ is left invertible. Then this residual generator is
stable, i.e., RI ∈ RH∞, and satisfies (7) for any I ∈ I.
Proof: First, we show stability of RI . From (19) and
Assumption 1, it suffices to show stability of Mi for i =
1, . . . , N . Since Mi can be represented by
Mi = I − Ci(sI − (Ai −HiCi))−1Hi,
Mi is stable.
We next prove (7), which is equivalent to left invertibility
of diag(SiMi)TyIaI from (20). From Assumption 2, TyIaI
is left invertible. Because SiMi is left invertible for i =
1, . . . , N , the claim holds.
Clearly, Theorem 1 provides a solution to Problem 1.
C. Proposed Disconnection-aware Attack Isolation
This subsection addresses Problem 2, the attack isolation
problem. On the premise that the residual generator designed
in the previous section is employed, we design Si to be
an isolation filter. When I is fixed, this problem can be
reduced to the perfect isolation problem with unknown input
decoupling [12, Chapter 13]. In the existing approach, Si is
designed, for a fixed i, such that
SiMiTyiai is left invertible, and SiMiTyia−i = 0 (21)
where Tyiai and Tyia−i denote the transfer matrices from ai
to yi and that from all attack signals except for ai to yi,
respectively. Indeed, this condition is equivalent to (9), and
there exists an isolation filter Si ∈ RH∞ that satisfies this
condition if and only if
rank
[
Tyiai Tyia−i
]
= dim(ai) + rankTyia−i
holds [12, Theorem 13.3]. Moreover, if the existence condition
holds, an isolation filter can systematically be designed. How-
ever, this existing design procedure cannot straightforwardly
be applied to our problem since the condition depends on I.
An important observation in the proposed residual generator
is that
i= SiMi(Gyiaiai +GyiviPiQLdiag(Gwiai)aI)
= SiMi(Gyiaiai +Gyivivi)
(22)
from (20), where Pi denotes the matrix that extracts vi from
vI . Hence, if Si isolates ai from vi, then ai can be isolated
from the other attacks regardless of I. This idea is illustrated
by Fig. 4, where the attack into the third subsystem, a3, and
Fig. 4. Idea of the proposed isolation. For the third subsystem, a3, the attack
to be detected, and v3, the inflowing interaction signal, are isolated instead
of a3 and the other attacks.
its inflowing interaction signals, v3, are isolated instead of a3
and the other attacks.
The following theorem describes a condition for attack
isolation based on this idea.
Theorem 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Consider the
residual generator designed in Theorem 1. There exists an
isolation filter Si that satisfies (9) if
rank [Gyiai Gyivi ] = dim(ai) + rankGyivi (23)
holds. Moreover, if Tvia−i := PiQLGwIa−i is right invertible,
this condition is also necessary.
Proof: The condition (23) is a necessary and sufficient
condition for existence of a filter such that
SiMiGyiai is left invertible, and SiMiGyivi = 0 (24)
from [12, Theorem 13.3]. If (24) holds, SiMiTyia−i = 0 holds
from (22). Also, (22) and SiMiGyivi = 0 in (24) indicate
SiMiTyiai = SiMiGyiai . Hence SiMiTyiai is left invertible.
Thus (21) holds, which leads to (9).
For necessity, assume (9), which is equivalent to (21). From
the right invertibility of Tvia−i , the latter condition in (21) is
equivalent to SiMiGyivi = 0. Then SiMiTyiai = SiMiGyiai
holds as shown above. Thus (24) holds, which leads to the
claim.
Theorem 2 gives a solution to Problem 2 because Gyiai and
Gyivi are independent of I. It should be emphasized that this
beneficial property, such that attack isolation can be achieved
by isolating local attacks and inflowing interaction signals, is
induced from the block diagonal structure of MI .
Remark: The theorem also claims necessity of the idea when
the transfer matrix from a−i to vi is right invertible, i.e., the
degree of freedom of the interaction signal is less than that of
the attacks injected into the other subsystems. This situation
typically arises when the number of subsystems is much larger
than that of interaction ports as illustrated by Fig. 4. Hence,
it can be expected that this approach is essentially required
especially for large-scale systems.
IV. APPLICATION TO LOW-VOLTAGE DISTRIBUTION
NETWORK WITH DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
In this section, as a specific application, we treat a low-
voltage distribution network with distributed generation. The
objective of this section is to show that this application fits
our framework satisfying its crucial assumptions. For general
security issues in power grids, see [31], [32].
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A. Distribution Network Model
We first provide a mathematical model of low-voltage distri-
bution networks with distributed generation. Consider a rooted
tree graph G = (N ,B) that represents a radial distribution
network where N and B ⊂ N ×N denote the sets of buses
and branches, respectively. Let NDG ⊂ N denote the index set
of the distributed generation buses. The voltage magnitude at
each bus is denoted by vk for k ∈ N . The complex power flow
from the lth bus to the kth bus is denoted by Slk = Plk+jQlk
for (l, k) ∈ B where j is the imaginary unit. Lines from the
lth bus to the kth bus have an impedance Zlk = Rlk + jXlk
for (l, k) ∈ B. The voltage magnitude at the substation bus
is assumed to be a constant v0. For interaction among those
physical quantities, we employ the LinDistFlow model [33],
which is commonly used for representing power flow and
voltage magnitude drop in radial networks. The power flow
equation at each bus without distributed generation is given
by
Slk =
∑
m∈N outk Skm, l ∈ N
in
k , k ∈ N \ NDG
where N ink and N outk represent the inflowing buses to and
the outflowing buses from the kth bus, respectively. Note that
power loss through a line is assumed to be zero in this model.
The voltage drop equation at each branch is given by
v2l − v2k = 2f(Slk), (l, k) ∈ B
with f(Slk) := RlkPlk + XlkQlk.
We next give a model of distributed generation with in-
verters. The operation of the inverter is to regulate the corre-
sponding voltage magnitude by generating reactive power. As
the inverter dynamics, we employ the first-order model used
in [34], where the input signal is the deviation of squared
voltages between the reference value and the actual value at
the bus and the output signal is the generated reactive power.
Its dynamics is represented by
q˙k = −(1/Tk)qk + (Kk/Tk)(v2k − v2k)
SDGk = p
g
k − pck + j(qk − qck)
Slk =
∑
m∈N outk Skm − SDGk , l ∈ N
in
k
, k ∈ NDG
(25)
where qk is the generated reactive power, vk is the reference
voltage magnitude, SDGk is the generated complex power, p
g
k
is a fixed active power generated by the distributed generation,
pck is a fixed active power consumed by the customer, q
c
k is a
fixed consumed reactive power, Tk > 0 is the time constant
of the inverter, and Kk ≥ 0 is a droop gain. We suppose that
the reference voltage magnitudes vk are identically set to the
substations’ reference voltage magnitude v0.
B. Representation as Networked System
First of all, we represent the dynamics of the distribution
network in the form of (1) and (3). Suppose that the dis-
tribution network is partitioned into multiple segments, each
of which is a collection of buses. Let Gi = (Ni,Bi) be
the subgraph corresponding to the ith subnetwork. The set
of the distributed generation buses in the ith subnetwork is
denoted by NDG,i. Without loss of generality, we assume that
Fig. 5. Example of a subnetwork in a radial distribution network. The
inflowing interaction is taken to be the stacked vector of the squared voltage
magnitude at the upstream bus and the power flow to the downstream buses.
every subgraph is connected and NDG =
⋃
iNDG,i. Note that
|Ni| = |Bi| + 1 holds for any i since the distribution grid is
radial.
We exemplify a construction procedure of a well-defined
subsystem Σi in (1) from the given subnetwork. Consider the
particular subnetwork illustrated by Fig. 5. The ith subnetwork
is composed of the buses Ni = {2, 3, 4}. Because the
distribution network is radial and the subnetwork is connected,
there exists a parent bus of the subnetwork. We call this bus the
upstream bus of Ni denoted by Ui = {1}. On the other hand,
there are buses to which power flows from the subnetwork.
We call those buses the downstream buses of Ni denoted by
Di = {5, 6}. The notation in Fig. 5 is used for the following
discussion.
It suffices to find signals that determine the power flows
SNi and the squared voltage magnitudes v
2
Ni for obtaining a
well-defined input-output mapping. Consider the power flow
equation with respect to Ni given by 1 −1 00 1 −1
0 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:−MNi
 S2S3
S4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
SNi
+
 0 −10 0
−1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:−MNiDi
[
S5
S6
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
SDi
+
 01
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:MDG,i
SNDG,i = 0.
Because MNi is nonsingular, SNi is uniquely determined when
SDi and SNDG,i are given. Consider also the voltage drop
equation with respect to Ni given by−1 0 01 −1
0 1 −1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
MTNi
 v22v23
v24

︸ ︷︷ ︸
v2Ni
+
 10
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:MTNiUi
v21︸︷︷︸
v2Ui
=
 2f(S2)2f(S3)
2f(S4)
 .
Similarly, v2Ni is determined from v
2
Ui and SNi . Thus, we take
the inflowing interaction signal in (1) as
vi := [v
2
Ui P
T
Di Q
T
Di ]
T, (26)
which is [v21 P5 Q5 P6 Q6]
T in the example in Fig. 5. The
state, the outflowing interaction signal, and the reference signal
are taken as
xi := qNDG,i , wi := [v
2T
Ni P
T
Ni Q
T
Ni ]
T,
ri :=
[
v20 v
2T
NDG,i p
gT
NDG,i p
cT
NDG,i q
cT
NDG,i
]T
.
(27)
Then we obtain the system representation in the form (1).
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The following proposition guarantees that the networked
system induced by this choice is well-defined as an input-
output map in general.
Proposition 1 Consider a radial distribution network with a
given partition. Take the inflowing interaction signal as (26)
and the other signals as (27). Then the subsystems Σi in (1)
and their interaction (3) are well-defined. Moreover, the entire
networked system is well-posed.
Proof: Let P denote the stacked vector of all active power
flows and other vectors are similarly denoted. From the matrix
form of the LinDistFlow model [35], the entire power flow and
voltage drop can be described by
−MP + MDGPNDG = 0, −MQ + MDGQNDG = 0,
MTv2 + mv20 = 2DRP + 2DXQ
with a matrix MDG where [m MT]T denotes the graph
incidence matrix and DR,DX represent the diagonal matri-
ces whose components are corresponding resistances and the
reactances, respectively. Thus, subtracting the relevant rows,
we obtain the LinDistFlow model for the ith subnetwork as
−MNiPNi −MNiDiPDi + MDG,iPNDG,i = 0,
−MNiQNi −MNiDiQDi + MDG,iQNDG,i = 0,
MTNiv
2
Ni + M
T
NiUiv
2
Ui + mNiv
2
0 = 2DR,iPNi + 2DX,iQNi ,
with the subtracted matrices. Because MNi is nonsingular [35]
when the subgraph is connected, PNi ,QNi , v
2
Ni are uniquely
determined from xi, ri, vi. From (25), xi is uniquely deter-
mined from ri and vi with any initial state. Since the inverter
dynamics from v2k to qk is strictly proper, the feedback system
composed of xi and v2NDGi is well-posed. Thus the subsystem
Σi is well-defined.
We show that the interaction is also well-defined. Let N :=⋃
iNi and M := N \N . Because NDG ⊂ N , we have
−MMPM −MMNPN = 0, −MMQM −MMNQN = 0,
MTMv
2
M + M
T
MNv
2
N + mMv
2
0 = 2DRMPM + 2DXMQM.
Because MM is nonsingular, PM, QM, v2M are determined
from wI and the reference signal. Those vectors contain vI .
Finally, because all physical quantities are well-determined
in the original system representation, the entire system is well-
posed.
The most important feature of this representation is that
the interaction structure has the same network topology as
that of the original graph. Hence, we can naturally employ
this network, which is typically sparse, for communication
topology of our distributed residual generator.
C. Stability of Distribution Network under Disconnection
We show that any distribution network fulfills Assump-
tion 1 as long as a collection of buses forms a subsystem.
Because reference signals are irrelevant to stability from
linearity of the system, the reference voltage magnitudes,
the generated/consumed active powers, and the consumed
reactive powers are assumed to be zero in this subsection.
The following lemma [36] provides another representation of
the distribution network used for stability analysis.
Lemma 4 Assume that all exogenous reference signals are
zero. The input-output map from qNDG to v
2
NDG for any radial
distribution network can be represented by
v2NDG = XqNDG
with a positive definite matrix X.
Lemma 4 indicates that the state behavior can be represented
by
q˙k = −(1/Tk)qk + (Kk/Tk)v2k, k ∈ NDG (28)
and
v2NDG = −XqNDG . (29)
Because those components are passive and the feedback is
negative, the entire system is also passive. Thus stability of
the network is preserved under any disconnection of buses.
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 3 Consider a radial distribution network with dis-
tributed generation whose mathematical model is given by
the LinDistFlow model and the inverter dynamics (25). This
system is internally stable under any disconnection of buses.
Proof: Because (28) is a stable single-input single-output
system and the signs of the coefficients for the input and
output signals are positive, the inverter dynamics is passive.
Hence, the diagonal system composed of the inverters is also
passive. On the other hand, because X is positive definite
from Lemma 4, the map from qNDG to vNDG is also passive.
Because their interaction forms a negative feedback, the entire
system is also passive and internally stable from the passivity
theorem [29, Theorem 5.4]. The stability is guaranteed for any
network topology as long as the network is radial. Because the
radial property is preserved under disconnection of buses, the
resulting distribution network is also stable.
Theorem 3 claims that distribution network systems with
inverter-based distributed generation modeled by (25) satisfy
the condition of Assumption 1 by letting each elements of I
contain a collection of buses.
Remark: The system representation (28) and (29), which
is used for proving stability, is inadequate for our distributed
residual generator design. In (29), the interaction matrix LI
in (3) is given as X, which is a dense matrix in general. Thus,
this system representation means that the communication
structure among the local residual generators to be designed
becomes also dense although the graph under a typical distri-
bution network is sparse. It should also be remarked that, it is
unclear that the system representation in Proposition 1 has the
passivity property. Indeed, the dimensions of vi and wi can be
different, and hence the supply rate cannot even be taken as
long as the interactions signals are not reduced further. Thus,
passivity cannot straightforwardly be utilized for residual
generator design with separation-based reconfiguration in this
application.
In summary, it has been shown that this application satisfies
the crucial assumption in our framework. In the next section,
we will illustrate the proposed residual generator design and
its practical impacts by means of this example.
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Fig. 6. Schematic diagram of the CIGRE benchmark model of a European
low-voltage power distribution network with distributed generation.
TABLE I
ACTIVE/REACTIVE POWERS IN THE RESIDENTIAL SUBNETWORK
bus R11 R15 R16 R17 R18
pgk (W) 3500 5500 4000 4500 3000
pck (W) 2295 5440 5440 2295 2720
qck (VAr) 300 960 480 600 400
V. SIMULATION WITH CIGRE BENCHMARK MODEL
A. Simulation Setup
We provide numerical results for the CIGRE benchmark
model of a European low-voltage power distribution net-
work [18] with distributed generation, whose infrastructure
is illustrated in Fig. 6. In particular, we treat the residential
subnetwork. The line impedance is computed from the dataset
in [18] on the premise that the network is balanced. We sup-
pose that the customer at every load has distributed generation
with an inverter. The generated/consumed active power and
the consumed reactive power of the distributed generation are
given in Table I. The time constant of the inverters and the
droop gains are uniformly given by Tk = 2 s and Kk = 2,
respectively.
The partition of the distribution network is given in Table II.
This system satisfies Assumption 1 from the discussion in the
previous subsection. We suppose that the generated reactive
powers of the inverters can be measured by the residual
generator. The error feedback gain inside the ith local residual
generator Hi is determined through the linear quadratic regu-
lator (LQR) design method. The detector Θi is designed such
that
Θi : θi(t) =
{
alarm, if ‖i(t)‖ > γi,
no alarm, otherwise,
TABLE II
PARTITION OF THE RESIDENTIAL SUBNETWORK
buses composed of the subsystem
Σ1 R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15, R16
Σ2 R9, R10, R17, R18
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm and γi represents a
prescribed threshold.
As a threat model targeting the distribution network, a
voltage reference attack treated in [37], [38] is supposed to
be injected into the distributed generation at the k0th bus for
a fixed k0 ∈ NDG. The effect of the attack is modeled as
a simple step function beginning at t0 s. Accordingly, the
fabricated squared reference voltage magnitude is represented
by
v2k0(t) =
{
v20, if t ≤ t0,
a, otherwise
where a is a positive scalar value that represents the amplitude
of the attack. The attack is injected into the bus R18 starting at
t0 = 1. Accordingly, the detection threshold γi is determined
to be aαi where αi is the Euclidean norm of the DC (direct
current) gain from the attack input port to the residual relevant
to the attacked subsystem. The objective of the attack is to
amplify deviation of the voltages at all distributed generator
buses from the reference value.
We compare the proposed distributed attack detector with
the naive distributed attack detector. Three distributed state
observers are designed under different weights for the LQR
design. The state and input weights are given as Q = qI
and R = rI with the identity matrix I whose dimension is
compatible with the corresponding signals, where
q ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}
and r = 1, respectively. We refer to the resulting gains as “low
gain,” “moderate gain,” and “high gain,” respectively.
B. Simulation Results
Attack Detection: First, we investigate detection capability
of the proposed residual generator under disconnection. Sup-
pose that the filter Si = I for any local residual generator. The
time responses of the Euclidean norm of the residuals in per
unit (p.u.) under measurement noise are illustrated in Fig. 7,
where the base unit is taken to be the detection threshold,
i.e., γi = 1. In Fig. 7, the residuals of the separated residual
generator R2, which corresponds to the attacked subsystem,
after the reconfiguration are not depicted. The horizontal
broken line depicts the threshold for raising an alarm and
the vertical broken lines depict the detection time instants.
The curves approaching the threshold are the local residuals
relevant to Σ2 into which the attack is injected, while the
curves taking smaller values are those relevant to Σ1. The
detection time instants with the naive approach, the proposed
approach with the low gain, that with the moderate gain, and
that with the high gain are 6.51 s, 5.45 s, 2.98 s, and 1.49 s,
respectively. This figure, first, verifies the theoretical finding
that the stability of the residual generator is preserved under
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Fig. 7. Time series of ‖i(t)‖ in per unit obtained with the naive approach,
the proposed approach with the low gain, that with the moderate gain, and
that with the high gain. While the other curves at the bottom are the local
residuals relevant to the non-attacked subsystem Σ1, the curves approaching
the threshold are those relevant to the attacked subsystem Σ2,
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Fig. 8. Time series of the voltage magnitude deviations vk − v0 in per unit
at all buses obtained with the naive approach, the proposed approach with the
low gain, that with the moderate gain, and that with the high gain.
disconnection. It can also be observed that the detection time
is shorter as the feedback gain increases.
The time series of the voltage magnitudes of all buses in
p.u. are illustrated in Fig. 8 where the base unit is taken
to be the reference voltage. It is indicated that early attack
detection helps in suppression of voltage magnitude deviation
caused by malicious actions. Note that, because the dynamics
of the distribution network itself is invariant under any attack
detector, the behavior of the voltage magnitude deviations
before attack detection and bus disconnection is also invariant.
It can also be observed from Fig. 7 that the effect of
the noise is enlarged as the feedback gain increases. Indeed,
the induced 2-norm of the DC gain from the attack input
port to the residual of Σ2 is given by 1.65, 1.42, 0.79, 0.27,
respectively. Hence, although the detection time is made faster
by introducing high gain feedback, the attack sensitivity is
made small, and as a result, sensitivity to noise is made large.
To reduce noise effects, consider designing Si to be a noise
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Fig. 9. Time series of ‖i(t)‖ obtained through the distributed residual
generators with the noise reduction filter.
reduction filter. The ith filter is represented by Si = diag(Ψk)
where Ψk is designed to be the second-order Bessel filter with
the cutoff frequency 1 Hz, which is twice of the reciprocal
of the inverter’s time constant. The time response of the
Euclidean norm of the residuals with the noise reduction filter
is depicted by Fig. 9. It can be observed that the noise is
significantly reduced by the filter. Furthermore, the detection
time of the proposed residual generator is still faster than
that of the naive approach. It should be noted that the time
constant of the residual generator is made large owing to the
noise reduction filter. As a result, the detection time is longer
compared to the case of Fig. 7.
Attack Isolation: It is found at the bottom of Fig. 9 that
the residual signal in terms of the non-attacked subsystem is
excited by the attack. Although the amplitude is not very large,
those residual signals can be a cause of misidentification of the
attacked subsystem. To enhance the identification capability,
we design S1 to be an isolation filter with noise reduction.
It can be confirmed that this partition satisfies the existence
condition on an isolation filter in Theorem 2. The unknown
input observer [12, Chap. 6] is employed for the isolation and
S1 is constructed as the cascaded system with the isolation
filter and the Bessel filter designed in the previous example.
The time response of the Euclidean norm of the residuals
with the filter is depicted by Fig. 10. This figure indicates
that the residual signals outside the attacked subsystem excited
by the attack are almost completely removed by the isolation
filter without delay of detection. As claimed in the theoretical
results, the attack isolation is successfully performed.
In summary, the numerical examples indicate that the
proposed detector can preserve its detection and isolation
capability under attack containment in an incident handling
process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Incident handling is a crucial notion for coping with adverse
events. This study has treated incident handling for networked
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Fig. 10. Time series of ‖i(t)‖ obtained through the distributed residual
generators with the filter composed of the isolation filter and the noise
reduction filter. The residual signals in terms of the non-attacked subsystem
are mostly removed without detection delay.
control systems and pointed out the importance of the con-
tainment step, which is carried out by disconnecting attacked
components. Topology change caused by disconnection can
lead to loss of detection capability of the equipped model-
based attack detector. Separation-based reconfiguration has
been proposed and the disconnection-aware attack detection
and isolation problems have been addressed. A design method
of a distributed residual generator based on retrofit control
has been developed. Its practical impacts are verified through
numerical examples of low-voltage distribution networks.
An important direction for future work is attack detector
design, which determines performance of the detection unit,
such as true and false alarm rates. Moreover, the procedure
of disconnecting components has not been discussed in detail.
In practice, the unit that executes the disconnection is also a
part of the networked control system, and hence a security
framework including the disconnection unit with combination
of network security techniques is needed.
APPENDIX A
DETECTION WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF INITIAL STATE
When the initial state is unknown, there exists a possibility
for undetectable attacks that take advantage of this lack,
called zero-dynamics attack [39]. Zero-dynamics attacks are
carried out by injecting a particular signal that excites the
zero dynamics of the system to be protected. When the zero
dynamics is stable, zero-dynamics attacks are generally not
very threatening because those effects are diminishing by
themselves. However, if the system has unstable zeros, the
state can diverge by zero-dynamics attacks without being
detected. Such unstable zeros should be eliminated through
modification of system architecture. This appendix shows that
our proposed residual generator does not create additional
unstable zeros.
The definition of invariant zeros, which is a standard notion
of zeros in the state-space representation, is as follows [40].
Definition 2 (Invariant Zero) Consider a state-space repre-
sentation of a linear time-invariant system with the matrices
(A,B,C,D). The invariant zeros of the system are defined to
be the complex numbers s0 such that
rank
[
A− s0I B
C D
]
< n+ min(m, p)
where n,m, p denote the dimensions of the state, input, and
output, respectively. When the real part of s0 is negative
and nonnegative, s0 is called a stable and unstable zero,
respectively.
Observe that
I = diag(SiMi) (diag(Gyivi)vI + diag(Gyiai)aI)
where the ith block diagonal component Mi represents an
observer for the ith subsystem. Because an observer with static
error feedback does not move zeros, we expect that the entire
system has no unstable zeros if the ith subsystem and the
system from aI to vI have no unstable zeros. Let TvIaI denote
the system from aI to vI . The following assumption is made.
Assumption 3 The system TvIaI , whose state-space form is
consistent with (1) and (3), has no unstable zeros for any I ∈
I.
Under Assumption 3, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4 Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Assume that
all subsystems are stable. Consider the residual generator in
Theorem 1. If SI has no unstable zeros, then all invariant
zeros of the system from aI to I are stable for any I ∈ I.
Proof: Observe that the system from aI to I can be
represented by SIMITyIaI . It suffices to show that
SIMITyIaI
= SIMI [diag(Gyivi) diag(Gyiai)]
[
TvIaI
I
]
has no invariant zeros in the time domain. Because a cascaded
system composed of two systems that have no unstable zeros
does not have unstable zeros, from the assumptions, it suffices
to show that MIdiag(Gyi(vi,ai)) has no unstable zeros. Owing
to its block diagonal structure, we show that MiGyi(vi,ai) has
no unstable zeros.
Noticing that invariant zeros are invariant under coordinate
transformation, we take ei := xi − xˆi and fi := xi + xˆi
with χˆi itself. Then the realization of MiGyi(vi,ai) with this
coordination can be described by
e˙i = (Ai −HiCi)ei + (U ′i −HiV ′i )v′i
f˙i = Aifi +HiCiei + (U
′
i +HiV
′
i )v
′
i
˙ˆχ = Aiχˆ+HiCiei +HiV
′
i v
′
i
y − yˆi = Ciei + V ′i v′i
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where U ′i := [Ui Xi], V
′
i := [Vi Yi], and v
′
i is the stacked
vector of vi and ai. Then we have
Ai −HiCi − sI 0 0 U ′i −HiV ′i
HiCi Ai − sI 0 U ′i +HiV ′i
HiCi 0 Ai − sI HiV ′i
Ci 0 0 V
′
i

=

I 0 0 −Hi
0 I 0 Hi
0 0 I Hi
0 0 0 I


Ai − sI 0 0 U ′i
HiCi Ai − sI 0 U ′i
HiCi 0 Ai − sI 0
Ci 0 0 V
′
i
 .
From Assumption 3, the rank of this matrix is deficient if
and only if s is an eigenvalue of Ai. From the assumption,
all eigenvalues of Ai are stable. Thus the invariant zeros are
stable, which proves the claim.
Theorem 4 shows the validity of our approach even without
knowledge of initial state.
APPENDIX B
BRIEF REVIEW OF RETROFIT CONTROL
Retrofit control has originally been proposed for facilitating
modular design of a control system, i.e., independent design
of subcontrollers only with its corresponding subsystem model
in a networked system. The networked system of interest in
the retrofit control framework is depicted in Fig. 11a, where
G1, . . . ,GN denote the transfer matrices of subsystems, L de-
notes the transfer matrix of the interaction, and K1, . . . ,KN
denote subcontrollers to be designed. In the retrofit control
framework, it is supposed that there are N subcontroller
designers each of whom is responsible for designing her
corresponding subcontroller Ki only with the model informa-
tion on her own subsystem Gi. A crucial premise of retrofit
control is that the preexisting system Gpre is internally stable,
where Gpre represents the interconnected system composed
only of diag(Gi) and the interaction L without the controller
diag(Ki). The objective of the subcontroller designers is to
improve a desirable control performance while preserving the
stability.
A block diagram of the isolated feedback system from
the viewpoint of the ith subcontroller designer is depicted in
Fig. 11b. The transfer matrix Mwivi denotes the input-output
map from vi to wi with the feedback controller Ki. The diffi-
culty for designing Ki in Fig. 11b is that stability of the entire
networked system in Fig. 11a may be lost even if Ki stabilizes
the local closed-loop system. The fundamental idea of retrofit
control is to design each subcontroller so as to maintain the
closed-loop relationship between its corresponding interaction
signals to be invariant. The mathematical description of this
idea is given by
Mwivi = Gwivi (30)
where Gwivi denotes the submatrix of Gi with respect to wi
and vi.
We refer to the controllers that stabilize Gi and satisfy (30)
as retrofit controllers. By means of retrofit controllers, modular
design of subcontrollers can be achieved as shown in the
following proposition [17].
(a) Block diagram of the networked
system of interest in the retrofit con-
trol framework.
(b) Block diagram from the view-
point of the ith subcontroller de-
signer.
(c) The internal structure of all output-rectifying retrofit controllers.
Fig. 11. Block diagrams relevant to retrofit control.
Proposition 2 Assume that Gpre is internally stable and Gi is
stable for i = 1, . . . , N . If Ki stabilizes Gi and satisfies (30)
for any i = 1, . . . , N , then the networked control system in
Fig. 11a is internally stable.
Note that the conditions become also necessary when the
model of the other subsystems and the interaction are com-
pletely unknown to the subcontroller designer [17]. Note also
that the same idea can be adopted even without the technical
assumption on stability of every subsystem Gi although (30)
takes a more cumbersome form [17].
The condition in Proposition 2 can equivalently be rewritten
by
GwiuiQiGyivi = 0 (31)
where Qi := (I − KiGyiui)−1Ki ∈ RH∞ is the Youla
parameter of Ki and Gwiui ,Gyivi ,Gyiui are the submatri-
ces of Gi with respect to the subscript signals. A sufficient
condition for (31) given by
QiGyivi = 0 (32)
provides a particular class of retrofit controllers, referred to
as output-rectifying retrofit controllers, which are defined as
the controllers such that the corresponding Youla parameter
Qi ∈ RH∞ satisfies (32). This class of retrofit controllers
is tractable in the sense that all output-rectifying retrofit con-
trollers can explicitly be parameterized with a free parameter
when the interaction signal vi is measurable as shown in the
following proposition [17].
Proposition 3 Assume that the interaction signal vi is mea-
surable in addition to the measurement output yi. Then Ki
is an output-rectifying retrofit controller if and only if there
exists an internal controller Kˆi such that
Ki = KˆiRˆi, Qˆi := (I − KˆiGyiui)−1Kˆi ∈ RH∞
with Rˆi = [I −Gyivi ].
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Proposition 3 implies that an internal structure of all output-
rectifying retrofit controllers is illustrated by Fig. 11c. One of
the features observed in this structure is that the control input
ui is generated through a locally stabilizing controller Kˆi with
a “rectified” measurement yˆi, which is given by
yˆi = Rˆi[y
T
i v
T
i ]
T = yi −Gyivivi,
where the effects of vi to yi are eliminated in Rˆi. This recti-
fication is the essential technique for constructing an output-
rectifying retrofit controller. The assumption on interaction
measurability can be fulfilled by introducing additional sensors
in practical applications.
On the other hand, we can consider another class of retrofit
controllers that have a dual form of (32). Define input-
rectifying retrofit controllers as the controllers whose Youla
parameter Qi ∈ RH∞ satisfies
GwiuiQi = 0. (33)
However, compared to (32), this condition is difficult to exploit
for control of physical systems. Observe that (33) has only the
trivial solution Qi = 0 when the dimension of the input signal
ui is less than that of wi for a full-column rank transfer matrix
Gwiui . Although we have to create additional input ports,
e.g., introducing new actuators, to increase the dimension of
ui, equipment of additional actuators requires more efforts
than that of sensors in general. For this reason, no specific
design methods for input-rectifying retrofit controllers have
been developed so far.
Indeed, the feedback architecture inside the distributed
observer designed in this paper satisfies (33). An important ob-
servation here is that the control signals inside our distributed
observer are not physical signals but cyber signals, and hence
we can freely adjust its parameters such as dimension and
corresponding injection ports as conducted in our proposed
method. This beneficial property enables us to apply the input-
rectifying retrofit controller structure to the problem addressed
in this study.
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